I was reading a paper concerned with the comparison of Karl Pribram's holonomic theory of mind with other models (though there seem to be no cogent other models, but rather a systematic collection of data with a pre-assumed notion that a theory will somehow pop out of all of it). While I was reading the paper something was said with regards to the ultimate reality of mathematical 'truth', in a way that as soon as I read it made me wonder at how I had not noticed the logic and depth of the question before.
Our scientific laws are, of course, written in the language of mathematics, and any serious scientist needs to develop their arguments mathematically as well as conceptually. It is something of a mystery that our mathematical language appears to describe physical laws so accurately, in as much as there is a correlation between mathematical equations and the physical results we obtain with them in experiments, and their consequent predictive qualities.
It is not surprising, then, that mathematics seems to be the natural language of the universe. It has troubled me that many of the mathematical arguments regarding the classical physical world are more often thatn not statistical in nature, particularly as we measure more and more at the quantum level of 'reality'. At the most extreme end of the belief in mathematics as the true nature of 'reality' Max Tegmark has proposed that the universe is mathematics. Truly the predictive power of mathematics is compelling and like most people I really didn't put too much thought into how convenient it was that a language devised by humans (for that is what it is) should so (seemingly) exactly match the base of reality.
But, what was drawn to my attention was the fact that our mathematics is based upon algorithms which are fed initial conditions and by means of the algorithm produce some predicted result. All seems well...except, does it seem likely or reasonable to think of the universe as being made of objects interacting with each other by means of algorithmic equations? The natural corollary of such a position is that of a dualism, that there are physical entities and an idea-like realm of laws; in other words the mathematical models we use cannot really be the 'reality', but are simply models which describe events pretty well. They are, in other words, contingent upon context. Actually we know this to be true, because the simple mathematical rules which have worked so well with regards to the classical realm are found to be inadequate to express the quantum realm - such that apparently simple summations (2+2, for example) become contingent, commutability not being a basic and necessary function of the quantum realm.
It strikes me, then, that we ought to keep in mind that mathematics, like any other form of language, is contingent; that a methematical argument in and of itself is not the thing itself but rather an approximation of how things are like, from a particular perspective. It is little wonder, then, that string theorists have tied themselves in knots as their arguments are pretty much entirely mathematical constructions - as if the mathematical equations themselves held truth/are truth. It always struck me as odd that extra dimensions should be invoked, without any real explanation of what a dimension actually is.
In the same way it has always puzzled me why anyone would talk of what 'shape' the universe is, as if somehow 'shape' and 'form' are objective entities - as if such concepts have any reality outside of a subjective purview (which links with such questions as how 'old' the universe is).
Just something more to think on, in terms of the search for scientific truth..... whatever that may mean..
Tuesday, 22 May 2012
Saturday, 7 April 2012
The title of this blog is Ontological Holism - Reclaiming Atheism, so I thought I'd write about why I've included the term ontological. I've seen the argument used that science is simply about facts and evidence and that is, quite simply, wrong. Science is about using facts and evidence to come to an understanding of the nature of things. Logic and reason are used to make sense of the evidence - or to put it another way, a narrative about what the evidence might tell us is formed and that, the narrative structure within which evidence is viewed, is ontology.
Ontology, then, is very important. A very good example of how important is Einstein's insight into the nature of space and time, as espoused in his theories of Special and General Relativity. He wasn't working with any different data or 'facts' than other scientists, he didn't discover some new evidence, he considered the implications of questioning the narrative framework (the ontology) within which that evidence was viewed. Sometimes these narratives are so ingrained within our culture that it takes some imagination to question them. Sometimes the over-arching cultural narrative is so ingrained that a language capable of discussing another perspective is diffcult to tie down.
Einstein, essentially, wondered if the a-priori assumption that time was constant was valid. From his musings he elucidated many startling insights into our physical world. That there is a 'speed limit' of c, the speed of light, that cannot be breached. That energy and mass are equivalent (E=mc2), that the passage of time is relative, that space-time is warped by mass (and energy), and that gravity is a result of that warping. These ideas are profound in their importance to our understanding of the physical universe we inhabit.
At the same time as Einstein was producing his ontological masterpieces new discoveries were being made at the sub-atomic level. Discoveries that had those making them scratching their heads as they seemed to make no sense. Tiny particles called electrons seemed to be jumping from one energy level to another - as if their energy were stored in fundamental 'bits' (or quanta, as they came to be called). Entities behaved as particles in some contexts and as waves in others - even when individual specimens were measured. As we've gone on we've discovered that particles can be 'entangled', that a measurement on one can 'instantaneously' affect the other and even that one can affect a measurement after it has been made.
What can we make of these findings? What do they mean for our understanding of the universe? Well, most of these aspects are, by and large, ignored within a framework of 'materialism', and any mention of the possible implications of these aspects of physical evidence are dismissed as 'woo'. In fact, what we have with 'materialism' (or hard-materialism) is an ontology that just, basically, ignores these aspects as irrelevant. This seems, to me, to be bad science. In fact the ontology that has gained a fervent grip upon science is totally at odds with the evidence. The nature of time is simply not addressed, nor are the implications of quantum mechanics (and even Einstein's therories of Relativity) upon the fundamental question of what matter and spatial dimension really are.
When I hear seemingly intelligent physicists extol the explanatory nature of our concept of entropy with regard to time I wonder how much thought they've put into what they've said, and how deeply they have thought on the matter. When they follow that up, or precede it, with something along the lines of 'we know that the universe is 13.7 billion years old' then I see the power of narrative upon our thinking.
Ontology, then, is very important. A very good example of how important is Einstein's insight into the nature of space and time, as espoused in his theories of Special and General Relativity. He wasn't working with any different data or 'facts' than other scientists, he didn't discover some new evidence, he considered the implications of questioning the narrative framework (the ontology) within which that evidence was viewed. Sometimes these narratives are so ingrained within our culture that it takes some imagination to question them. Sometimes the over-arching cultural narrative is so ingrained that a language capable of discussing another perspective is diffcult to tie down.
Einstein, essentially, wondered if the a-priori assumption that time was constant was valid. From his musings he elucidated many startling insights into our physical world. That there is a 'speed limit' of c, the speed of light, that cannot be breached. That energy and mass are equivalent (E=mc2), that the passage of time is relative, that space-time is warped by mass (and energy), and that gravity is a result of that warping. These ideas are profound in their importance to our understanding of the physical universe we inhabit.
At the same time as Einstein was producing his ontological masterpieces new discoveries were being made at the sub-atomic level. Discoveries that had those making them scratching their heads as they seemed to make no sense. Tiny particles called electrons seemed to be jumping from one energy level to another - as if their energy were stored in fundamental 'bits' (or quanta, as they came to be called). Entities behaved as particles in some contexts and as waves in others - even when individual specimens were measured. As we've gone on we've discovered that particles can be 'entangled', that a measurement on one can 'instantaneously' affect the other and even that one can affect a measurement after it has been made.
What can we make of these findings? What do they mean for our understanding of the universe? Well, most of these aspects are, by and large, ignored within a framework of 'materialism', and any mention of the possible implications of these aspects of physical evidence are dismissed as 'woo'. In fact, what we have with 'materialism' (or hard-materialism) is an ontology that just, basically, ignores these aspects as irrelevant. This seems, to me, to be bad science. In fact the ontology that has gained a fervent grip upon science is totally at odds with the evidence. The nature of time is simply not addressed, nor are the implications of quantum mechanics (and even Einstein's therories of Relativity) upon the fundamental question of what matter and spatial dimension really are.
When I hear seemingly intelligent physicists extol the explanatory nature of our concept of entropy with regard to time I wonder how much thought they've put into what they've said, and how deeply they have thought on the matter. When they follow that up, or precede it, with something along the lines of 'we know that the universe is 13.7 billion years old' then I see the power of narrative upon our thinking.
Sunday, 4 March 2012
Physical Something v. Metaphysical Something
There is an interesting discussion on the RDF forum at the moment entitled Physical Nothing v. Metaphysical Nothing. What struck me was imbedded within a link in the OP - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nothingness/
The bit that caught my attention; "Van Inwagen's answer is that we are actually interested in concrete things. A concrete entity has a position in space or time. For instance, a grain of sand, a camel, and an oasis are all concrete entities. Since they have locations, they have boundaries with their environment. (The only exception would be an entity that took up all space and time.)
Admittedly, points in space and time have locations. But concrete entities are only accidentally where and when they are. All concrete entities have intrinsic properties. Their natures are not exhausted by their relationships with other things. Consider Max Black's universe containing nothing but twin iron spheres. The spheres are distinct yet have the same relationships and the same intrinsic properties."
My Italics.
Now it seems to me that the hard-materialist position is essentially posited upon this (mis)apprehension - that there are such things as the 'concrete entities' referred to here. The first thing one might note here is that the evidence for the reality of such entities is Max Black's universe. Clearly (at least I think it is clear) Max Black's universe is not a physical universe, it is a metaphysical universe, so it seems odd that one would argue for a physicalist argument based upon a metaphysical space.
Let me be clear here, that such entities simply cannot physically exist, and this becomes clearer when one considers firstly how we know about any physical entity and secondly how we come to describe those entities. It is the second step that leads to the (mis)apprehension of 'concrete entities'.
So, what constitutes something physically real? We would need to be able to measure it, and to measure it it must have a physical effect, or interaction, with a measuring apparatus. That measuring apparatus might be a human eye, or it might be a weighing scale or it could be a photosensitive cell in a scientific experiment. Without a measurement of something, without an interaction, then that thing is not there.
The allegedly concrete things within our universe are known to us not directly, but because they have a physical interaction with us. An iron sphere, for example, will reflect a stream of photons into my eye and a process within my brain transforms that information into a model. What I actually have, then, is not a real, physical iron sphere in my head but rather a metaphysical interpretation. So one might use this metaphysical iron sphere as a fundamental entity within a metaphysical space. How did this iron sphere come to be, and is it really fundamental? What are the forces that hold the iron atoms together in this sphere? How did the iron atoms come to be?
Now, you could argue that all that I have pointed out is that the iron spheres (or any object) can be relational to other entities, but that doesn't rule out that such a description will not exhaust any description of that entity - in other words that the entity could still have properties that are intrinsic and have no relation to anything else. Okay, perhaps, but just stop and think about that. In order for me to say anything meaningful (physical) about that object I must be able to measure it in some way - otherwise I would be describing something immaterial about the object. The only way that a physical property of an object can be described is in terms of its relationship with some other thing.
So, in terms of our physical universe there can be no 'concrete entities'; any description of an object's physical reality must be made via its relationship with the universe. As far as I can see this is the fundamental error of the hard-materialist position; it is a reductionist argument and, as such, mistakes metaphysical models with physical reality.
The bit that caught my attention; "Van Inwagen's answer is that we are actually interested in concrete things. A concrete entity has a position in space or time. For instance, a grain of sand, a camel, and an oasis are all concrete entities. Since they have locations, they have boundaries with their environment. (The only exception would be an entity that took up all space and time.)
Admittedly, points in space and time have locations. But concrete entities are only accidentally where and when they are. All concrete entities have intrinsic properties. Their natures are not exhausted by their relationships with other things. Consider Max Black's universe containing nothing but twin iron spheres. The spheres are distinct yet have the same relationships and the same intrinsic properties."
My Italics.
Now it seems to me that the hard-materialist position is essentially posited upon this (mis)apprehension - that there are such things as the 'concrete entities' referred to here. The first thing one might note here is that the evidence for the reality of such entities is Max Black's universe. Clearly (at least I think it is clear) Max Black's universe is not a physical universe, it is a metaphysical universe, so it seems odd that one would argue for a physicalist argument based upon a metaphysical space.
Let me be clear here, that such entities simply cannot physically exist, and this becomes clearer when one considers firstly how we know about any physical entity and secondly how we come to describe those entities. It is the second step that leads to the (mis)apprehension of 'concrete entities'.
So, what constitutes something physically real? We would need to be able to measure it, and to measure it it must have a physical effect, or interaction, with a measuring apparatus. That measuring apparatus might be a human eye, or it might be a weighing scale or it could be a photosensitive cell in a scientific experiment. Without a measurement of something, without an interaction, then that thing is not there.
The allegedly concrete things within our universe are known to us not directly, but because they have a physical interaction with us. An iron sphere, for example, will reflect a stream of photons into my eye and a process within my brain transforms that information into a model. What I actually have, then, is not a real, physical iron sphere in my head but rather a metaphysical interpretation. So one might use this metaphysical iron sphere as a fundamental entity within a metaphysical space. How did this iron sphere come to be, and is it really fundamental? What are the forces that hold the iron atoms together in this sphere? How did the iron atoms come to be?
Now, you could argue that all that I have pointed out is that the iron spheres (or any object) can be relational to other entities, but that doesn't rule out that such a description will not exhaust any description of that entity - in other words that the entity could still have properties that are intrinsic and have no relation to anything else. Okay, perhaps, but just stop and think about that. In order for me to say anything meaningful (physical) about that object I must be able to measure it in some way - otherwise I would be describing something immaterial about the object. The only way that a physical property of an object can be described is in terms of its relationship with some other thing.
So, in terms of our physical universe there can be no 'concrete entities'; any description of an object's physical reality must be made via its relationship with the universe. As far as I can see this is the fundamental error of the hard-materialist position; it is a reductionist argument and, as such, mistakes metaphysical models with physical reality.
Saturday, 25 February 2012
Ghostly Consciousness and Natural Selection
While consciousness is not what this blog is intended to be about I am starting here for two very simple reasons. Firstly, because one of the cornerstones of the reductionist mindset is that consciousness will be explained as simply "atoms doing their thing" and secondly because I think I have a logical question that undermines the basic premise of this idea.
The position that consciousness will be explained by a reductionist description of the atoms in the brain is based upon a logical conceit; that consciousness is an 'illusion' and has no effect upon the physical world. In other words, that the experiential nature of our existence is simply a by-product of unconscious activity and that any conscious decision that we seem to make is actually a trick our brains play on us so that we believe that we are acting consciously.
Now, here's my challenge to this. Presumably this notion of the brain 'fooling' this ghostly 'I' must be predicated upon physical actions. In other words there must be a physical cost involved in the brain processing information in order to fool the 'I' into considering itself a real entity. Now, if a creature could as easily perform all of its tasks without the need for this superfluous, non-interactive self then it would gain an advantage in terms of energy costs compared to the creature busy expending energy 'fooling' this useless 'I'.
While it is perfectly feasible to argue that conditions could have been such that environmental pressures might not have been strong enough to wipe out the conscious 'version' of that creature, there would certainly be nothing that ought to have wiped out the unconscious version - except, perhaps for a huge stroke of bad luck. So, we ought to have examples of non-conscious humans; humans who can't even understand what this experiential nature of existence might be. To my knowledge no such humans have been discovered.
Now, one could argue that they might have learnt to 'feign' experiential knowledge in order to fit in with their conscious neighbours - but this is, of course, utterly illogical. If the conscious neighbours are discussing their experiential existence then their experiential existence is affecting their physical actions, which undermines the basic premise that the conscious self is non-interactive.
The position that consciousness will be explained by a reductionist description of the atoms in the brain is based upon a logical conceit; that consciousness is an 'illusion' and has no effect upon the physical world. In other words, that the experiential nature of our existence is simply a by-product of unconscious activity and that any conscious decision that we seem to make is actually a trick our brains play on us so that we believe that we are acting consciously.
Now, here's my challenge to this. Presumably this notion of the brain 'fooling' this ghostly 'I' must be predicated upon physical actions. In other words there must be a physical cost involved in the brain processing information in order to fool the 'I' into considering itself a real entity. Now, if a creature could as easily perform all of its tasks without the need for this superfluous, non-interactive self then it would gain an advantage in terms of energy costs compared to the creature busy expending energy 'fooling' this useless 'I'.
While it is perfectly feasible to argue that conditions could have been such that environmental pressures might not have been strong enough to wipe out the conscious 'version' of that creature, there would certainly be nothing that ought to have wiped out the unconscious version - except, perhaps for a huge stroke of bad luck. So, we ought to have examples of non-conscious humans; humans who can't even understand what this experiential nature of existence might be. To my knowledge no such humans have been discovered.
Now, one could argue that they might have learnt to 'feign' experiential knowledge in order to fit in with their conscious neighbours - but this is, of course, utterly illogical. If the conscious neighbours are discussing their experiential existence then their experiential existence is affecting their physical actions, which undermines the basic premise that the conscious self is non-interactive.
What's this about
As someone with a very deep interest in science, especially Physics, and as someone who would count themself as an atheist, I have become frustrated at how both science and atheism have been hijacked by a sort of quasi-philosophical position that might be termed 'hard-materialist' or 'atheist-materialist'. I say quasi-philosophical because there is a seemingly shared philosophical position but it lacks any kind of logical formalism. This position is based, quite simply, upon the notion of reductionism. What I'm aiming for with this blog is to highlight the many logical contradictions within that position.
I have tried to address these issues on science and atheist forums but this idea of 'hard-materialism' as equivalent to science and atheism is very entrenched. At the mere mention of any other position one is immediately confronted with accusations of trying to push some religious agenda, or of dealing in 'woo' (and interestingly the concept 'woo' and QM are almost synoymous within this thinking). The tactics of such communities is to deride the position as in some way religious and then to simply circularise any argument to little more than semantic gamesmanship.
Well, I am an atheist, and I believe that reductionist science is running itself down a blind alley searching for the modern equivalents of the planet Vulcan and the aether. What is lacking is any coherent ontology. There is an ontology, but it is an ad-hoc ontology, and is wracked with contradiction - which is what I hope to highlight here.
Thanks for reading.
I have tried to address these issues on science and atheist forums but this idea of 'hard-materialism' as equivalent to science and atheism is very entrenched. At the mere mention of any other position one is immediately confronted with accusations of trying to push some religious agenda, or of dealing in 'woo' (and interestingly the concept 'woo' and QM are almost synoymous within this thinking). The tactics of such communities is to deride the position as in some way religious and then to simply circularise any argument to little more than semantic gamesmanship.
Well, I am an atheist, and I believe that reductionist science is running itself down a blind alley searching for the modern equivalents of the planet Vulcan and the aether. What is lacking is any coherent ontology. There is an ontology, but it is an ad-hoc ontology, and is wracked with contradiction - which is what I hope to highlight here.
Thanks for reading.
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